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Abstract: Ostracism, or social exclusion, is widespread and associated with a range of 
detrimental psychological and social outcomes. Ostracism is typically explained as instrumental 
punishment of free-riders or deviants. However, this instrumental account fails to explain many 
features of real-world ostracism, including its prevalence. We hypothesized that ostracism can 
emerge incidentally (non-instrumentally) when people choose partners in social interactions, 
and that this process is driven by simple learning mechanisms. We tested this hypothesis in four 
experiments (n = 456) with economic games on dynamic social networks. Contrary to the 
instrumental account of ostracism, we find that the targets of ostracism are not primarily free-
riders. Instead, incidental initial variability in choosing partners for social interactions predicts 
later ostracism better than the instrumental account. Using computational modeling, we show 
that simple reinforcement learning (RL) mechanisms explain the incidental emergence of 
ostracism, and that they do so better than a formalization of the instrumental account. Finally, 
we leveraged these RL mechanisms to experimentally reduce incidental ostracism. Our results 
demonstrate that ostracism is more incidental than previously assumed and can arise from basic 
forms of learning. They also show that the same mechanisms that result in incidental ostracism 
can help to reduce its emergence.  
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Ostracism, or the exclusion of an individual from social interaction, is a persistent phenomenon 
in human groups1. Ostracism is distinct from the other major type of social exclusion, social 
rejection2. While ostracism consists of simply neglecting or avoiding another individual2, and 
is subjectively characterized by the feeling of being ignored3, social rejection is explicit, 
purposeful and often aggressive in nature2. However, despite its relative subtlety, ostracism can 
have more severe consequences than explicit social rejection and even bullying for both the 
mental and physical health of the excluded individual1,4. Indeed, a large body of evidence 
demonstrates that being ostracized is highly aversive, resulting in threatened fundamental 
psychological needs of belonging, self-esteem, meaningful existence, and sense of control1, 
reduced work satisfaction and increased staff turnover rates3, increased physiological stress 
responses5, and activation of brain regions that overlap with those processing physical pain6.  
The detrimental consequences of ostracism are typically attributed1,7 to its 
putative primary evolutionary function as a low cost solution to the free-rider problem8–13. In 
line with this view, theoretical accounts of ostracism commonly conceptualize it as a motivated 
instrument to punish or discipline free-riders and other annoying deviants7,14,15, such as 
aggressive upstarts16 or individuals with a contagious disease9. Experimental studies support 
this instrumental account of ostracism, by showing that ostracism, especially if it is coordinated, 
can promote cooperation17–21. Similarly, social psychology research has shown that ostracism 
is used instrumentally to punish burdensome individuals (e.g., individuals who are 
dispositionally disagreeable22, which is predictive of free-riding23, or individuals who are bad 
co-players in computerized games24–26). 
However, there are several characteristics of real world ostracism that are not well 
accounted for by the instrumental view. First, the victims of real world ostracism often appear 
to be selected randomly27. Furthermore, the incidence of ostracism reported in samples from 
the general population is very high (e.g., daily ostracizing events)28, and episodes where the 
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ostracizers (sources) are oblivious of the ostracized (target), or where the reason for ostracism 
is unclear, are more common than episodes of instrumentally motivated ostracism28. For 
example, a recent study of workplace ostracism demonstrated that an individual’s perception of 
being ostracized was unrelated to others’ intention to ostracize29. Moreover, ostracism often 
takes place in dyadic interactions28,30, rather than in coordinated group actions that have been 
the focus of research on instrumental ostracism and cooperation18–20. These findings suggest 
that a substantial degree of experienced ostracism might be incidental rather than instrumental, 
raising the possibility that the reasons for the high prevalence of ostracism among humans are 
not fully accounted for by the instrumental view.  
 Here, we propose that ostracism among humans can be caused incidentally by 
self-organization of social interaction partners who intend to maximize rewards and avoid 
punishment, without instrumental motivation for ostracism. This form of ostracism is an 
emergent phenomenon, a macro-level pattern that is not reducible to beliefs and desires of 
individuals to ostracize31, which entails a radically different explanation from the instrumental 
account. The instrumental and emergence accounts of ostracism are complementary rather than 
mutually exclusive, as it is clear that instrumental ostracism occurs in the real world30 and the 
two forms of ostracism can co-exist in principle. Importantly, although the possibility that 
experienced ostracism might be incidental has been proposed previously3,32, the scope of, and 
the actual mechanisms causing, incidental ostracism are not well understood. We tested, and 
corroborated, the emergence account of ostracism using real-world social networks, a series of 
behavioral experiments, and computational analyses. 
 A growing empirical literature on dynamic social networks provides clues on how 
ostracism could emerge incidentally. When individuals choose partners to interact with, they 
form and sever network links with others, which can be beneficial for cooperation33–36. 
Cooperation is facilitated because partner choice establishes relationships (links) between 
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individuals contingent on past behavior (e.g., being cooperative). Crucially, this implies that as 
people select partners, others are excluded from that interaction. This will be the case even if 
individuals have no intention of punishing free-riders, but simply seek out payoff maximizing 
interactions. Thus, ostracism might be a natural consequence, or by-product, of partner choice 
in social networks, a relationship that appears to have been largely overlooked (but see a 
discussion comment in ref. 34, p. 6). Furthermore, theoretical work on the formation of social 
networks through partner choice has shown that associative reinforcement learning (RL), where 
agents repeat rewarded actions and avoid punished actions, can result in considerable social 
network structure, where some agents are less popular than others, even in simple games37.  
 Against this background, we hypothesized that ostracism can emerge incidentally 
if people make choices about interaction partners based on what they learnt from previous 
interactions. Incidental ostracism would thereby be a side effect of the same processes that lead 
to reciprocity in social networks. Distinct from the instrumental account, which predicts that 
people instrumentally ostracize poor interaction partners, such as free-riders11,17, our emergence 
account predicts ostracism (some people are excluded from interactions) also in the absence of 
free-riding or deviant behavior. To illustrate, if students on the first day of term randomly select 
a possible friend in the class or dormitory, and continue to interact with the same person if the 
experience was positive, some students might become, and stay, ostracized purely by chance 
(i.e., without free-riding). Crucially, this would be evident even if the ostracized students 
objectively were as nice as the popular ones, and no motivation for ostracism existed in the 
group. This is an example of path dependence38, which entails that early random outcomes 
probabilistically constrain the future. Path dependence in ostracism is a key prediction of the 
emergence account: the learning process should generate increasing returns for repeated 
interactions with the same social partners, even if these partners were initially randomly 
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selected, as any beneficial interaction (e.g., mutual cooperation) with a specific partner will 
increase the expected value of interacting with this partner in the future38.  
To test the emergence account, we used a combination of real-world social 
networks, behavioral lab experiments, and computational agent-based modeling (ABM). Our 
experimental model of social interaction (drawing inspiration from theoretical work37) had 
groups of six participants (players) playing an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma  (Experiment 1 and 
Experiments 3-4) or coordination (Experiment 2) game for monetary payoffs (Figure 1). Each 
player selected one partner in each experimental period (i.e., established a directed link) and 
could be selected by multiple other players (max 5) as partner in each period. We tested if the 
resulting evolving social network would be path dependent, so that early variability in partner 
choices would lead some players to become popular and others to be largely left out (incidental 
ostracism). In Experiment 2 (coordination game), we investigated the incidental emergence of 
ostracism in a game without free-riding, in order to experimentally rule out instrumental 
punishment of free-riders as an explanation for ostracism. These two experiments confirmed 
the prediction that ostracism can be path dependent and emerge incidentally. We formalized 
the emergence account as an agent-based RL model, which provided a superior account of the 
data relative to a formalization of the instrumental account, and showed that RL mechanisms 
are sufficient for generating incidental ostracism. Finally (Experiments 3-4), guided by the 
mechanistic RL model, we devised an experimental intervention that reduced the emergence of 
incidental ostracism.  
	
Results 
Real-world social networks confirm a central prediction of the emergence account 
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Do real-world social networks exhibit the basic characteristics predicted by the incidental 
emergence account of ostracism? To answer this question, we first analyzed four pre-existing 
longitudinal data sets, involving the formation of friendships in school classes and among 
college freshmen (see Supplementary Methods for details).  
 People differed markedly in their popularity in all four social networks. The Gini 
coefficient, which quantifies the degree of inequality (0 = no inequality, 1 = maximum 
inequality) in the distribution of a resource (here, popularity), ranged between .32 and .39. This 
shows that while some people were highly popular, others were ostracized. A core prediction 
of the emergence account is that popularity (and hence ostracism) will be path dependent. Path 
dependence entails that a system’s early states probabilistically constrain its future states38. In 
keeping with path dependence, early popularity (the first mapping of the social network) 
predicted late popularity (the last mapping of the social network) in all four datasets (Figure 2, 
largest p – value = .008).  
These data are in line with a central prediction of the emergence account – that 
there is a positive relationship between early and late popularity – and suggest that ostracism 
might emerge in an incidental manner in the real world. However, as the data sets did not track 
the behavior of the respondents (e.g., free-riding), we cannot rule out instrumental ostracism as 
an explanation for the relationship between early and late popularity. Similarly, we cannot rule 
out the contribution of stable traits such as attractiveness (e.g., students that are more attractive 
might be more popular both at early and late timepoints). For these reasons, we next conducted 
a series of lab experiments where we carefully contrast predictions from the emergence account 
and the instrumental account, by testing how path dependence and free-riding contribute to 
ostracism. Note that participants in the experiments were completely anonymous (see 
Methods). Therefore, individual differences in stable traits (e.g., physical attractiveness) can be 
ruled out as alternative explanations for ostracism. 
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Objective ostracism arises during task and predicts subjective ostracism 
In our first experiment, anonymous participants (n = 186) repeatedly selected partners and 
actions during iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma games in a dynamic social network with fixed size 
(see Figure 1 and Supplementary Figure 1). The PD is the quintessential example of a social 
dilemma, and thereby ideal for contrasting the instrumental account with the emergence account 
of ostracism.  
In the experiments, we defined objective ostracism as the difference between the 
network in-degree (i.e., popularity) expected if each player was selected as partner once per 
round (i.e., 35, the absence of ostracism), and the actual in-degree (the total number of times 
that a participant was chosen as a partner by the other 5 group members). Positive differences 
thereby indicate players who were selected less than once per period on average, and negative 
differences indicate players who were selected more than once per period on average. Objective 
ostracism was thus by definition relative in our experiments; some people were ostracized to 
the degree that others were popular (i.e., ostracism is the inverse of popularity).  
We used the objective ostracism measure first to characterize the distribution of 
ostracism in our experimental networks. Consistent with the real social networks analyzed 
above, the Gini coefficient was ~.32 (bootstrapped 95% CI [.29, .36]), indicating considerable 
variability in objective ostracism. Furthermore, the distribution of objective ostracism was 
markedly different from what would have been the case if participants randomly selected a 
partner in each period (bootstrapped Kolmogorov-Smirnov [K-S] test: D = 0.34, p < .0001, see 
Figure 3a), which corresponds to a Gini coefficient of ~.087 (95% CI [.086, .089]). These results 
reflect considerable variance in objective ostracism, which is required to compare the different 
accounts of ostracism. 
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 Next, we confirmed that objective ostracism was tightly related to the subjective 
experience of ostracism. We captured subjective ostracism as the mean of the four fundamental 
psychological needs measured by the need-threat scale39 (Cronbach’s α = 0.91), a standard 
measure of subjective ostracism, completed after the experiment. We found a strong predictive 
relationship such that higher objective ostracism was associated with stronger subjective 
ostracism (see Figure 3b). This relationship remained significant when controlling for total 
payoff, both with the composite measure and with the individual subscales (see Supplementary 
Table 2). These results demonstrate that our measure of objective ostracism was strongly 
associated with the subjective experience of ostracism and thereby provide construct validity 
for our experimental approach2. 
 
Objective ostracism is path dependent as predicted by the emergence account 
Next, we contrasted explanations from the instrumental and emergence accounts for the 
occurrence of objective ostracism in Experiment 1. The instrumental account holds that free-
riding behavior should strongly predict ostracism whereas the emergence account predicts that 
objective ostracism should be path dependent. Path dependence means that early random 
variability (i.e., variability that is not explained by differences in early behavior) in who is 
selected as a partner should have a strong effect on later objective ostracism. In the emergence 
account, path dependence explains why observed objective ostracism can be incidental rather 
than instrumental. We found above that real social networks exhibit a correlation between early 
and late popularity, suggestive of path dependence (see “Real-world social networks confirm a 
core prediction of the emergence account”). Crucially, here we assessed if this relationship still 
holds when free-riding behavior is accounted for, which is necessary for establishing path 
dependence as an explanation for incidental ostracism38. In other words, path-dependence 
entails that ostracism should occur even in the absence of free-riding (see Supplementary Note 
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1 for additional analyses showing that partner choice was sensitive to free-riding, an effect 
predicted by both accounts), which is not predicted by the instrumental account.  
We tested these distinct predictions of the emergence and the instrumental 
account by assessing how free-riding and path dependence explained later ostracism. 
Specifically, we used objective ostracism and free-riding behavior, operationalized as the 
proportion of Defect actions as initiator and responder, during the initial five periods as 
predictors of objective ostracism in the final five period (objective ostracism in the five first 
periods was positively correlated with free-riding both as initiator and responder [rs = .45 and 
.39]. Variance inflation factor [VIF] analyses demonstrated that these correlations did not cause 
problematic regression collinearity: max VIF = 2.94. Moreover, the findings are robust to 
alternative, non-linear, model specifications, see Supplementary Tables 3-4). As predicted by 
the emergence account, early objective ostracism strongly predicted objective ostracism at the 
end of the experiment when controlling for free-riding (β = 1.2, SE = 0.24, t = 5.1, p < .0001, 
Figure 4a-b). In contrast, early free-riding did not reliably predict final objective ostracism, 
neither as initiator nor as responder (smallest p = .09, see Figure 4b and Supplementary Note 1 
for further analyses). In a control analysis, we tested whether path dependent ostracism was in 
place also earlier during the experimental session and found that it was. Specifically, we could 
predict ostracism in periods 11-15 (rather than 31-35) from initial ostracism (β = 1.67, SE = 
0.21, t = 7.82, p <. 00001), controlling for free- riding. Thus, our results are robust to the exact 
number of social interaction periods. Together, path dependence, rather than free-riding, was 
the best predictor of ostracism, as anticipated by the emergence account.  
As an additional test of path dependence, we conducted the same analysis for the 
subset of participants (n = 64) who never defected as initiator (behavior as initiator is a more 
accurate measure of free-riding tendency than as responder, as the latter also includes responses 
to other players’ defections), and found again a strong path dependent relationship (β = 1.79, 
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SE = 0.44, t = 3.9, p < .0001). This analysis shows, in analogy to our introductory example 
about freshman students, that despite having objectively equivalent, or even better, quality as 
partners, some players initially became, and subsequently stayed, ostracized. Notably, objective 
ostracism was tightly related to the subjective experience of ostracism also in this sub-group (β 
= 0.28, SE = 0.08, t = 3.58, p < .0001), which demonstrates the detrimental subjective 
consequences of incidental ostracism.   
Together, these results demonstrate path dependence for objective ostracism; 
early variability in objective ostracism best explained later objective ostracism, which indicates 
that ostracism, as predicted, can be to a large degree incidental. The emergence account, but 
not the instrumental account, fully predicts these results.  Thus, ostracism is more incidental 
than previously assumed. 
 
Path dependent ostracism in a pure coordination game without free-riding 
In Experiment 2 (n = 90), we tested whether ostracism would occur and exhibit path dependence 
in social interactions without the possibility of free-riding. Specifically, participants interacted 
in a pure coordination game (often referred to as “choosing sides”). In this game, in contrast to 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, there is no tension between cooperation and selfishness. Instead, 
to receive reward, the participants had to coordinate on one of two possible actions. This game 
is often used to exemplify the logic of social norms, such as left- or right-hand side traffic – it 
doesn’t matter which side you drive on, as long as it’s on the same side as everyone else. 
Accordingly, the instrumental account of ostracism makes no predictions about this type of 
game, as there is no free-riding to punish. In contrast, our emergence account predicts that 
ostracism should emerge in much the same way as in the Prisoner’s Dilemma situation of 
Experiment 1.  
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 In line with this prediction, we found that neither the Gini coefficient (~ .37, 95 
% CI for difference to Experiment 1 [-0.02, .11]), nor the distribution (see Supplementary 
Figure 2) of objective ostracism in Experiment 2 were significantly different from those of 
Experiment 1 (K-S test: D = .06, p = .91). Furthermore, the degree of objective ostracism again 
predicted subjective ostracism (Supplementary Figure 4) (controlling for total payoff) (β = 0.28, 
SE = 0.12, t = 2.3, p = .02. Removing one participant with a standardized residual exceeding 
2.5 SD: β = 0.32, SE = 0.11, t = 2.86, p = .005). Thus, ostracism was just as prevalent when 
free-riding was not possible (Experiment 2) as when it was possible (Experiment 1). 
Crucially, ostracism was path dependent also in Experiment 2 (Figure 4c): the 
degree of objective ostracism in the first five periods strongly predicted objective ostracism in 
the final five periods (β = 2.82, SE = 0.45, t = 6.63, p < .0001). In analogy to Experiment 1, we 
controlled for coordination failures as both initiator and responder (smallest p = .18, see Figure 
4d). Limiting the analysis to participants without coordination failures showed the same pattern 
(no failures as responder, N = 46: β = 2.57, SE = 0.57, t = 4.5, p < .0001; no failures as initiator, 
N = 15: β = 1.39, SE = 0.42, t = 3.29, p = 0.004). Thus, Experiment 2 demonstrates path 
dependent, incidental ostracism in social interactions where free-riding is not possible. The 
instrumental account cannot readily explain these results, which in contrast are directly 
predicted by the emergence account of incidental ostracism. 
 
An Agent-Based Model demonstrates that reinforcement learning mechanisms are 
sufficient for the incidental emergence of ostracism 
Our emergence account postulates that ostracism arises incidentally from the interaction of 
individuals who select their partners based on simple associative RL mechanisms. To formally 
test this explanation for the incidental ostracism observed in Experiments 1 and 2, we developed 
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a generative, agent-based simulation model where each agent´s behavior was controlled by RL 
mechanisms (the emergence model)40,41. We contrasted the emergence model against a 
formalization of the instrumental account (the instrumental model). Both models were devoid 
of parameters that directly regulated group-level characteristics; thus all results arise from the 
interaction of independent, simple, but psychologically plausible, agents41. We first describe 
the two models. Next, we compare them formally and find that the emergence model explains 
the individual-level data substantially better than the instrumental model. We then simulate the 
models to show that the emergence, but not the instrumental, model is sufficient for explaining 
the path dependent emergence of incidental ostracism. Finally, we find that the same model 
generalizes out-of-sample from the Prisoner’s Dilemma (Experiment 1) to the coordination 
game (Experiment 2). 
Emergence model. The agents selected partners and actions (exactly as in the experiments), 
and updated the values associated with both through basic RL (see Supplementary Methods for 
details). The basis for each agent was the standard RL (Rescorla-Wagner) learning rule, which 
specifies how the prediction error – the difference between the experienced outcome and the 
expected outcome – drives learning42. Crucially, the agents did not instrumentally punish 
defectors using ostracism, but cared only about their own payoffs from each interaction (as both 
responder and initiator) (see Supplementary Figure 2-3 for a description of how the model’s 
internal dynamics and parameters generate path dependent ostracism). 
Instrumental model. According to the instrumental account, ostracism is a way to punish free-
riders. Thus, in analogy to strategies for the standard iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game, the 
instrumental account is in essence a “grim” strategy43, where a defecting agent will be 
deterministically and indefinitely ostracized (not chosen as partner). This basic model was 
generalized to the full space of more flexible and forgiving strategies, by parameterizing 
ostracism (as well as Prisoner’s Dilemma action selection) as probabilistic rather than 
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deterministic (see Supplementary Methods for details). Thus, according to the instrumental 
model, and in contrast to the emergence model, agents instrumentally punish defectors using 
ostracism, without regard for their own outcomes. The instrumental model thereby corresponds 
to a behavioral heuristic, conceptually similar to strategies for the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma 
game (e.g., Tit for Tat). 
Model comparison. We fitted the two models, which had the same number of free parameters 
(i.e., 3), to the individual-level trial-by-trial choice data in Experiment 1 (n = 186). Model fits 
served to contrast the relative explanatory power of the two accounts (see Supplementary 
Methods for details). Model comparison strongly favored the emergence model: the choices of 
168 out of 186 participants were better explained by the emergence model than the instrumental 
model with ∆ BIC > 2. 164 participants had ∆ BIC > 10 in favor of the emergence model. Using 
AIC instead of BIC gives identical results. In contrast, the choices of only four participants 
were better explained by the instrumental account (see Figure 5a). The exceedance probability 
for the emergence model, which denotes the probability that a model is the most common in 
the population, was 1 (see Figure 5b). These results provide strong support for the emergence 
model outperforming the instrumental model as an account of the experimental data (see 
Supplementary Table 9 for an analysis how estimated model parameters relate to empirical 
ostracism, and Supplementary Note 2 for a verification that learning, rather than choice 
perseverance or inertia, is needed for explaining our results).  
 
Model validation. Evidence that one model explains the data better than an alternative model 
is only the first step in model comparison, as a better fit does not guarantee that the winning 
model actually can reproduce the effects of interest44. We used two additional approaches to 
validate the emergence model: tests of generative performance and model generalizability44 
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First, we tested the capability of the emergence model to reproduce the effects of 
interest, i.e., its generative performance. To this end, we simulated the emergence model (with 
parameter values fixed to the median of the estimated individual parameters) and submitted the 
simulated data to the same statistical test as our empirical results. Thus, we tested if the model, 
with empirical parameter values, reproduced path dependent ostracism (note that this is a more 
stringent criterion than only evaluating the fitted values44,45). This was indeed the case: as 
shown in Figure 6 (a-b), the emergence model faithfully generated path dependence. In contrast, 
the instrumental model, based on empirical parameter values, did not (Figure 6, c-d). This 
shows, in concert with model comparison, that the emergence model but not the instrumental 
model easily captures the observed path dependent ostracism. In the Supplementary Note 2 and 
Supplementary Figure 9, we in addition show that the emergence model, but not the 
instrumental model, readily generates correlations between early and late popularity of the same 
magnitude as observed in the real-world social networks (Figure 2). 
Second, we assessed the generalizability of the emergence model by generating 
out-of-sample predictions (based on parameter values calibrated for Experiment 1) for 
Experiment 2. Note that Experiments 1 and 2 used different paradigms (Prisoner’s Dilemma 
and coordination game, respectively), which naturally makes out-of-sample prediction difficult. 
Despite this difficulty, the model predictions provided a good match to the data (Figure 7), 
which verifies the generalizability of the emergence model (we did not conduct the same 
analysis for the instrumental model; as free-riding was not possible in the coordination game, 
the instrumental model does not make any predictions for choice behavior in Experiment 2). 
Together, these results demonstrate that a simple RL model, without instrumental 
ostracism, is sufficient for explaining path dependent incidental ostracism. In contrast, the 
formalization of the instrumental account was unable to do so. Furthermore, the results show 
that the same RL mechanisms are valid across game types (Prisoner’s dilemma vs. 
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coordination), which constitutes strong support for the learned basis of ostracism proposed by 
the emergence account. 
 
Causal manipulation of path dependence reduces objective and subjective ostracism 
The model validation clearly supports our account that the incidental emergence of ostracism 
is caused by basic RL mechanisms. To provide even stronger evidence for this view, we next 
utilized these mechanisms to causally manipulate path dependence, by setting the group on a 
specific path. We conducted two experiments that varied the strength of this manipulation. In 
Experiment 3 (n = 90), each player was paired up with another player in the first period and 
then allowed to freely select partners for the remaining 35 periods (exactly as in Experiment 1). 
Similarly, in Experiment 4 (n = 90) we initially paired each player up with another player but 
this time for five initial periods, and then allowed them to freely select partners for the 
remaining 35 periods. In both Experiments 3 and 4, the social interaction during paired and free 
choice trials occurred in the form of the Prisoner’s Dilemma game (as in Experiment 1; 
Experiment 1 was also comparable to Experiments 3 and 4 in the distribution of participant age, 
gender, and the degree of free-riding, see Supplementary Note 1). The model, with parameters 
estimated from Experiment 1, predicted that this manipulation of path dependence would 
reduce objective ostracism, if free-riding during the paired periods is accounted for (which 
should increase ostracism according to both incidental and instrumental accounts: predicted β 
= 3.7) (Figure 8). In other words, the emergence model predicts that path dependence can be 
leveraged as an intervention against the emergence of incidental ostracism, by pairing up 
players. 
 The proportion of periods where the players selected the same partner as they 
interacted with in the first period (Experiment 1: 0.17, Experiment 3: 0.39, Experiment 4: 0.5), 
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was considerably higher in Experiments 3 and 4 than in Experiment 1 (Welch tests: t(101.34) 
= 5.47, p < .0001, t(98.76) = 7.48, p < .0001). The tendency to stick with the same partner was 
furthermore slightly stronger in Experiment 4 than Experiment 3 (t(175.6) = 1.96, p = .049). 
These results show that the manipulation was successful in setting the group on a particular 
path (see Supplementary Figure 9 and the Supplementary Note 1 for additional analyses of path 
dependence in Experiments 3 and 4). Next, we tested the model prediction that manipulating 
path dependence would reduce objective ostracism (Figure 8a). Confirming this prediction, 
objective ostracism, averaged across the entire experiment, was significantly lower in 
Experiment 3 (β = -6.79, SE = 2.76, t = -2.46, p = .015) and in Experiment 4 (β = -7.712, SE = 
2.82, t = -2.74, p = .007) than in Experiment 1 (Figure 8b). Objective ostracism in Experiments 
3 and 4 did not differ significantly (p = .76), although the difference was in the predicted 
direction (c.f., Figure 8a). Similarly, objective ostracism was lower also in the five very last 
periods in Experiment 3 (β = -0.95, SE = 0.47, t = -2.04, p = .042) and Experiment 4 (β = -1.08, 
SE = 0.47, t = -2.27, p = .024) than in Experiment 1. In these analyses we controlled for free-
riding in the initial (i.e., 1 or 5) paired periods, which, as the model predicted, in itself increased 
objective ostracism (β = 7.93, SE = 1.81, t = 6.72, p < .0001). Thus, while free-riding in the 
initial paired periods predicted being ostracized later, our analysis accounts for this variance, 
and shows that for an average participant (i.e., at the sample mean of free-riding in the paired 
periods), imposing path dependence reduces objective ostracism. This reduction was brought 
about by a stronger tendency to form lasting, mutual dyads (“friendships”), rather than an 
increase in network interconnectedness between all group members (see Supplementary Note 
1 and Supplementary Figure 7 for additional analyses). 
Imposing path dependence also reduced the inequality in objective ostracism: 
both Experiments 3 (~.26) and 4 (~.25) had lower Gini coefficients (adjusted for free-riding in 
the paired periods) than Experiment 1 (bootstrapped 95 % CI for difference between 
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Experiment 1 and Experiment 3: [-0.11, -0.006], between Experiment 1 and Experiment 4 [-
0.11, -0.02]. See Supplementary Figure 7 for Lorenz curves). Finally, we found that imposing 
path dependence led to a reduction also in the subjective experience of ostracism. Subjective 
ostracism was reduced in both Experiments 3 (β = -0.66, SE = 0.17, t = -3.78, p < .001) and 4 
(β = -0.7, SE = 0.17, t = -4.0, p < .0001) relative to Experiment 1 (Figure 8c). Together, these 
results provide strong evidence for the RL basis of incidental ostracism, and demonstrate that 
path dependence, which in itself is a signature of incidental ostracism, can be leveraged as an 
intervention to reduce both objective and subjective ostracism.   
 
Discussion 
Our results demonstrate that a substantial proportions of ostracism can be incidental and emerge 
from simple reinforcement learning mechanisms. Thus, rather than being restricted to the 
traditionally assumed instrumental response to the free-riding of others, ostracism occurred in 
our experiments to a large degree in the absence of free-riding. The emergence account of 
ostracism offers a distinct view on how the basic components of social interactions - selecting 
partners and establishing relationships - can lead to a substantial degree of ostracism, both 
expressed in objective social network structure and subjective experience. Furthermore, it 
provides clues of how ostracism can be reduced. Note that our findings do not disprove previous 
theoretical and empirical demonstrations of the power of ostracism to prevent free-riding, but 
suggest that commonly observed ostracism might be less instrumental than previously thought.  
Our use of agent-based computational modeling with empirically estimated 
parameters allowed us to demonstrate that basic RL mechanisms, without motivation for 
instrumental ostracism, are sufficient for explaining the results. In contrast, formalization of the 
instrumental account provided a worse fit to the experimental data, and failed to account for 
19	
	
path dependent ostracism. According to our model, path dependent ostracism originated from 
a positive feedback mechanism captured by RL, as consecutive rewarding interactions with a 
given partner cumulatively increase the probability of selecting the same partner again in the 
future, at the expense of selecting alternative partners. Naturally, this implies that path 
dependence can occur also in many non-social decision making situations where the 
environment provides structurally similar positive or negative feedback38. Our results further 
expand the scope of simple RL mechanisms for explaining seemingly complex social behaviors, 
such as economic game behavior46, social network structure37, behavioral traditions47, and 
social cognition48. 
Although the agent-based model shows that instrumental ostracism is not 
necessary for explaining the experimental results, we cannot exclude that some participants did 
have instrumentally punitive motivations for their partner choices. However, our analysis puts 
a clear upper bound on instrumental ostracism in our experiments, by showing that free-riding 
is a weak predictor of ostracism when path dependence is accounted for (Figure 4) and that 
incidental ostracism emerges also in a social setting where free-riding is not an option 
(Experiment 2). An intriguing possibility for real-world ostracism is the interaction between 
incidental and instrumental ostracism, so that incidental outcasts become stigmatized, for 
example if observers view ostracism as a signal of deviance (“no smoke without fire”), which 
could result in subsequent instrumental ostracism of the same individuals.  
Our findings have policy implications, as they provide an alternative explanation 
for the prevalence of ostracism, and make new suggestions for preventive interventions. 
Specifically, Experiments 3 and 4 demonstrated that incidental ostracism can be reduced by 
utilizing path dependence to enforce dyadic interaction between group members. The reduction 
of ostracism was brought about by an enhanced tendency for individuals to form stable mutual 
dyads (“friendships”), rather than an increased interconnectivity between all group-members. 
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Such mechanistically informed strategies represent important complements to previously 
suggested methods for preventing ostracism3,4, for example in school classes.  
Several limitations should be noted. Our experimental model, which was stylized 
and based on economic games with monetary payoffs, does not directly speak to forms of 
instrumental ostracism targeted at individuals who are not free-riders in a standard sense. For 
example, previous research has shown that people ostracize slow individuals in a virtual ball 
tossing game (Cyberball49)25,50. Such individuals are not free-riders per se but burdensome, in 
that they cause frustration and reduce the per unit time payoff to the focal individual (who 
typically knew the total numbers of rounds in the experiment25). However, our emergence 
account may well generalize to such situations, as interacting with burdensome individuals 
likely results in lower than average payoffs, which in turn promotes avoidance. In any case, 
evaluating the emergence models in other experimental situations, involving non-monetary 
payoffs, represents an important future direction. Other forms of punitive ostracism, such as the 
silent treatment between spouses28, fall outside our emergence account. Moreover, as our 
experiments were based on dyadic interactions, where the participants had no knowledge about 
the payoffs of group members they did not interact with, our findings do not speak to the role 
of welfare or group-level payoff concerns for the emergence of incidental ostracism. This 
intriguing question could for example be addressed by combining dyadic interaction with group 
interactions (e.g., in a Public goods game). Finally, given that our experimental model by design 
is highly simplified, it is likely that additional factors contribute to ostracism in real-world 
social situations (e.g., prior information about other individuals, physical appearance51). We 
view our experimental and computational model as a baseline to which such additional factors 
can be added. 
In summary, our experiments and computational modeling provide new insights 
into the mechanistic causes of ostracism in groups of interacting people. Understanding 
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ostracism as an emergent phenomenon has important ramifications for the analysis of its social 
function, and for designing interventions to combat ostracism. 
 
 
Methods 
Participants. A total of 456 (259 female, mean age ~ 24) individuals participated in the 
experiments, and typically (median) earned 37 CHF (~ 36 US $) during the experiment. Each 
experimental session included 2-3 groups of six participants. Experiment 1 included 186 
participants, and the three other experiments 90 participants each. The study was approved by 
the Human Subjects Committee of the Faculty of Economics, Business Administration, and 
Information Technology at the University of Zurich. Because the study was non-invasive and 
did not feature deception, signed consent was not required according to the approval. No 
individuals who had participated in any experiments involving deception (at the University of 
Zürich) were invited for participation.	
Experimental task. The experiments were conducted at the Laboratory for Experimental and 
Behavioral Economics at the Department of Economics, University of Zürich. Participants were 
seated in separate “cubicles” in a larger room. None of the experiments involved any deception.  
Before the experiment, the experimenter provided a brief verbal introduction to the participants, 
stressing that the experiment was conducted in real-time. The participants played an iterated 
Prisoner’s Dilemma (Experiments 1 & 3-4) or coordination (Experiment 2) game with partner 
choice for 35 periods in groups of six. The payoffs for the Prisoner’s Dilemmas were C/C = 2, 
C/D = 0, D/C = 3, D/D = 1, where C = Cooperate and D = Defect. The payoffs for the 
coordination game was A/A = 3, A/B = 0, B/B = 3, B/A = 0, where A = Action A and B = 
Action B. 
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Each experimental period began with a partner choice stage (Figure 1) where each 
player was indicated with a number (e.g., “Player 1”) in a matrix-like representation (see 
Supplementary Figure 1 for a period time-line and additional information). After partner 
choices, the participants were prompted to select an action (as initiator) for the interaction with 
the selected partner. The actions were referred to as action “A” and action “B” (e.g., rather than 
“Cooperate” and “Defect”) to avoid pronounced framing effects. The participants were then 
sequentially notified about which other players had selected them as partner, and asked to 
indicate their action in this interaction (as responder). Next, the payoffs for the initiator and the 
responder were displayed on their respective screens for each selection (thus, the action of the 
interaction partners was not explicitly stated and participants inferred it from the simple payoff 
matrix). If more than one player had selected a given player as partner, these interactions were 
realized in randomized order. Players who had not been selected as partners during a period 
waited until all interactions had been realized. Participants were not notified about the number 
of periods, to prevent end-game effects. The experiments began with written instructions, 
specifying the payoff matrix and the game rules (see Supplementary Methods for instructions), 
which was followed by a quiz to verify understanding. After the experiments, the participants 
filled in a computerized version of the need-threat scale39, a standard measure of subjective 
ostracism. The scale is composed of four subscales, designed to measure the fundamental 
psychological needs of belonging, self-esteem, meaningful existence, and sense of control. We 
averaged and reversed the subscales as a compact index of subjective ostracism.  
Experiments 3 & 4 in addition included instructions that participants would be 
paired with another player for one period (Experiment 3) or an undisclosed (to prevent “end” 
game effects) number of periods (Experiment 4) before they would be free to select partners for 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma interaction. Instructions and procedures of these two experiments were 
kept as close to Experiment 1 as possible. 
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Experiment1 1 had two payoff conditions: the cumulative payoff condition (n = 
78) and the randomized payoff (n = 108) condition. In the former, the payoff from each 
Prisoner’s Dilemma interaction in each period was summed up. In the latter, the payoff from 
one interaction in each period was randomly selected. To balance the monetary profit between 
the conditions, the randomized payoff condition had a five times higher conversion rate from 
experimental currency units to CHF. The randomized payoff condition was intended to mimic 
natural variability in the reinforcement provided for one´s behavior by the social environment 
as a test of robustness. Incidental ostracism generalized across the two reinforcement 
environments (Supplementary Note 1). Experiments 2-4 were all based on the randomized 
payoff condition, 
The payoff condition was crossed with a condition where the popularity (i.e., in-
degree) of each player from the previous period was displayed during the partner choice stage 
(i.e., visible [n = 96] vs not visible [n = 90]). This condition had no discernable effects on the 
results, and is for this reason only reported in Supplementary Table 6 and in the Supplementary 
Note 2. The reported results are based on data collapsed across this condition. Experiments 2-
4 involved no social information (i.e., the participants could not observe the popularity of the 
other players). 
Statistical analysis. All analyses were conducted in R 3.31. Linear regression was performed 
with the lm function. Explained variance refers to adjusted R2. See Supplementary Tables 3-6 
for alternative analyses using Quasi-Poisson regression. Bootstrap confidence intervals are 
percentile intervals.  
Data availability. The experimental data is available from the corresponding author. 
Real-world social networks. See Supplementary Methods for details about the real-world 
social network data analysis. 
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Agent-based modeling and model comparison. See Supplementary Methods for detailed 
information about the agent-based models and model-comparison. 
Code availability. The modeling code is available from the corresponding author. 
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Figure legends 
 
Figure 1. Experimental design. Participants played a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma (Experiments 1 & 3-4) or 
coordination game (Experiment 2) with free partner choice in groups of six players. (a) At the outset of a period, 
each participant chose a partner. (b) In each period, each player could take part in up to six independent games: 
one with the partner s/he selected (as the initiator) and up to five with the players who selected him/her (as the 
responder). For example, player 1 (P1) selected player 6 (P6) as initiator and was selected as partner by three 
players, resulting in four games for P1 (one as initiator and three as responder), while player 4 (P4) was not selected 
as partner by any other player, resulting in one game for P4 (as initiator) in that period. The players made separate 
game choices for each interaction, allowing each action to be conditioned on previous interactions (e.g., P1 could 
decide to cooperate with P6 but not with P4). The players only knew about the choices of players they interacted 
with themselves (e.g., P1 knew that P3 cooperated with P1, but not that P3 also interacted with P5, or the action 
choices of P3 and P5 in their interaction). The experiment consisted of 35 periods in total. See Methods for 
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information about the game payoffs, and Supplementary Figure 1 for a detailed overview of an experimental period 
from the point of the participant. 
 
 
Figure 2. Prediction of late popularity by early popularity in four different real-world social networks.  (a) 
University freshmen class, n = 32, (b) University freshman class, n = 34, (c) University freshmen class, n = 38, 
(d) Secondary school class, n = 26. Each cross denotes an individual. The red lines indicate the best fitting robust 
regression slopes. The popularity scores are T-scored (standardized with M = 50 and SD = 10) for comparability. 
 
 
Figure 3. Objective and subjective ostracism in Experiment 1. (a) Objective ostracism is prevalent. Positive 
values denote participants who were selected as partner on average less than once per period, and negative values 
denote participants who were selected as partner on average more than once per period. The dotted line represents 
the theoretical reference distribution based on completely random choices (i.e., absence of ostracism). The red line 
represents the empirical density. The figure includes all participants (n = 186) in Experiment 1.  (b) Objective 
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ostracism predicts subjective ostracism. The red line shows the unadjusted slope of objective ostracism. The 
figure includes all participants (n = 186) in Experiment 1. Each point represents one individual. 
 
 
Figure 4. Incidental, path-dependent ostracism in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game of Experiment 1 (n = 186) 
(a-b). (a) Positive relationship between early (five first) and late (five last) periods indicative of ostracism 
being path dependent. The solid line shows the slope, adjusted for the two free-riding regressors (% Defect 
actions as initiator and Responder). The points are slightly jittered along the x-axis for higher visibility. The figure 
includes all data points (n = 186). (b) Early ostracism predicts late ostracism better than free-riding. 
Contribution of each regressor (standardized) to the prediction of objective ostracism during the last five periods 
(model total R2 = .29) (see text for regression model details). Incidental, path dependent ostracism in the pure 
coordination game of Experiment 2 (n = 90) (c-d). (c) Path dependence between the first and last five periods. 
The solid line shows the slope, adjusted for the two coordination-failure regressors. The points are slightly jittered 
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along the x-axis for higher visibility. (d)  Early ostracism predicts late ostracism better than coordination 
failure. Contribution of each regressor (standardized) to prediction of objective ostracism during the last five 
periods (model total R2 = .54) (see text for regression model details). P(Uncoord.) = % of coordination failures. 
Error bars are 95% CI. *** = p < .0001, ns. = not significant.  
 
 
Figure 5. Comparison between emergence and instrumental models in Experiment 1. (a) Individual 
participant level. Choices of a large majority of participants were better explained by the emergence model than 
the instrumental model. A Bayesian information criterion (BIC) difference > 2 indicates positive evidence for one 
model over the other. (b) Exceedance probability. Random effects model comparison showing the posterior 
probability that the emergence model explains the data better. The green line displays P = 0.95. 
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Figure 6. Model validation based on generative performance. (a & c) Simulated path dependence. For the 
simulations, we used the estimated parameter values from Experiment 1 and tested if the candidate models could 
generate path dependent ostracism. Dots are simulated data, lines show the slope of path dependence from the data 
(red), the emergence model (blue), and the instrumental model (green). (b & d) Predictors of ostracism in 
simulated data (regression estimates) (blue = emergence model, green = instrumental model) overlaid with 
parameter estimates from the experimental data (red, see Figure 4). Error bars are standard errors of the regression 
coefficients from the experimental data (c.f. Figure 4). 
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Figure 7. Model generalizability. (a) Path dependence in Experiment 2 (coordination game) simulated by 
emergence model derived from Experiment 1 (Prisoner’s Dilemma). Dots are out-of-sample model 
predictions, based on parameter estimates from Experiment 1, lines show the slope of path dependence estimated 
from the experimental data (red) and the emergence model predictions (blue). (b) Predictors of ostracism 
(regression estimates) from emergence model predictions (blue) overlaid with parameter estimates from 
experimental data (red, see Figure 5). Error bars are standard errors of the regression coefficient from the 
experimental data. 
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Figure 8. Reduction in objective and subjective ostracism by causal manipulation of path dependence in 
Experiments 3 and 4. (a) Model predictions. According to the emergence model, imposing path dependence 
through pairing each participant with another participant for the first period (Experiment 3) or the first five periods 
(Experiment 4) should reduce objective ostracism. The predictions are adjusted for the influence of free-riding 
during the paired periods. (b) Confirmation of model predictions for objective ostracism. In keeping with the 
emergence model, objective ostracism was lower in Experiments 3 and 4 compared to Experiment 1. The plot 
shows regression coefficients, adjusted for free-riding during the paired periods. Error bars are 95% CI. (c) 
Imposing path dependence reduces subjective ostracism. The plot shows regression coefficients, adjusted for 
free-riding during the paired periods. Error bars are 95% CI. * = p < .05, ** = p < .01. 
 
